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concentrations.
As such, the court suggested that a seasonal
measurement would be more appropriate for establishing phosphorus
TMDLs for the reservoirs. Therefore, the court remanded this issue to
require EPA to justify how its annual period of measurement would
account for these seasonal variations.
Second, the court expressed concern with EPA's use of a less
stringent aesthetic water quality standard, instead of the more
stringent water supply standard, for formulating its phosphorus
TMDLs. It noted, however, that the current aesthetic water quality
standard was driven by the need to control excessive algal and aquatic
plant growth, the same problems phosphorus creates for drinking
water supplies.
Moreover, the scientific knowledge regarding
phosphorus pollution in the reservoirs was not complete. As such, the
record adequately supported the court's holding that EPA's use of an
aesthetic water quality standard was appropriate for formulating the
reservoirs' phosphorus TMDLs.
Third, the court found that if EPA were disregarding a widely used
and reliable scientific methodology in determining a margin of safety
for its phosphorus TMDLs, their action would be easily open to
challenge. However, it noted that in determining the TMDL margin
of safety for the reservoirs, EPA used a model applied to several New
York City reservoirs in the past. Moreover, information available on
the reservoirs was limited. As such, the appellate court felt that EPA
had used its best professional judgment in formulating the margin of
safety for the TMDLs.
Matthew j Costinett

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Cty. Conun'rs, 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit holder was shielded from Clean Water Act ("CWA") liability for
discharges of pollutants not listed in the permit, provided such
discharges were disclosed to the permitting authority and reasonably
contemplated in the permitting process).
Piney Run Preservation Association ("Association") brought suit in
United States District Court for the District of Maryland against
Commissioners of Carroll County, Maryland ("County"), alleging a
county-operated waste treatment plant discharged warm water into
Piney Run Stream ("Piney Run") in violation of the CWA.
The NPDES permit issued to Carroll County did not expressly
allow discharge of heated water. During the NPDES permitting
process, however, Carroll County disclosed the fact that the plant
would emit such water. The district court found the County liable
under the CWA for discharges from the Plant exceeding state water
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temperature standards.
Both the Association and the County
appealed. The Association argued the NPDES permit did not allow
heated effluent discharges; therefore, the plant violated the CWA by
discharging any level of heat into Piney Run.
The County contended it issued NPDES permits based on
compliance with state water quality standards. Because the Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") enforced state water quality
standards, the district court should have deferred to MDE in
determining whether the Plant's discharges adversely influenced Piney
Run's ambient temperature. Furthermore, the County claimed the
Association lacked Article III standing to sue in federal court, as
individual members of the group could not prove requisite injury-infact, traceable to the Plant's releases of heated effluent into Piney Run.
Finally, the County argued a "permit shield" barred suit against
NPDES permit holders for discharge of pollutants not expressly
considered under those permits.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the ambient
temperature of Piney Run had no bearing on its ultimate disposition.
Further, Association member Dorothy Rowland ("Rowland") could
show injury-in-fact required for Article III standing. Piney Run flowed
through Rowland's property, and was in a pristine state when she
purchased the tract in 1967. However, a high concentration of green
algae had recently formed in Piney Run, limiting Rowland's use of the
stream for livestock watering and recreational purposes.
The
Association presented evidence that the Plant discharged heat into
Piney Run. It also offered expert testimony showing a causal
relationship between green algae proliferation and an increase in
ambient stream temperatures. The court found the Plant's discharges
could cause or contribute to the kinds of injuries the Association
alleged. Thus, the Association demonstrated injury-in-fact traceable to
the actions of the County, thus bringing the action within purview of
Article III.
The appellate court disagreed with the County's interpretation of
the "permit shield" defense, finding that the CWA created strict
liability for all point-source discharges, unless exempted by an NPDES
permit. The permitting authority, in this case MDE, considered
discharge information from all relevant parties, calibrating permissible
releases under individual permits in accord with state water quality
standards. The effectiveness of the NPDES permitting process turns
on a permit holder's compliance with CWA reporting and monitoring
requirements. The court held that the CWA required the County to
disclose the nature of its effluent discharges to MDE. MDE could limit
pollutant releases if it reasonably anticipated resulting environmental
harms. Because the County disclosed the Plant's release of heated
effluent during the permitting process, the court held MDE reasonably
contemplated that the Plant would discharge heat pursuant to the
NPDES permit. Although the NPDES permit did not list heat as a
permitted pollutant, MDE considered the likely effects of such heat
releases in Piney Run during the permitting process. Thus, the CWA's
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"permit shield" defense barred the Association's suit against the
County.
Alan Curtis

SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
turbidity cannot be considered a pollutant under the Safe Drinking
Water Act for sentencing purposes).
An Ohio district court convicted John White and Carolyn Taylor,
employees of the Ohio County Water District, of making materially
false statements by submitting reports containing falsified turbidity
measurements to the Kentucky Division of Water ("DOW"). The
government filed this appeal to challenge the court's interpretation of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in determining White and
Taylor's sentences.
John White was the general superintendent at the Ohio County
Water District's drinking water treatment plant at Cromwell, Kentucky.
Carolyn Taylor was a Water District employee assisting White in
managing plant operations. One of their responsibilities was to submit
monthly operations reports to the DOW.
During a surprise inspection of the plant in January 1997, an agent
from the Division noted that daily logbooks recording the measure of
turbidity had been left blank for each of four four-hour shifts. The
plant employee responsible for recording these measurements told the
Division agent that she had purposefully left the log sheets blank
because the turbidity measurements were all above 0.5 which might
put the plant at risk of noncompliance.
Review of this evidence and subsequent interviews with plant staff,
including White and Taylor, revealed several instances of similar
falsifications of turbidity measurements and submissions of inaccurate
monthly reports. This suggested that the water plant had been out of
compliance with the federal and state turbidity regulations during
most of the months in question.
The trial court sentenced both White and Taylor without using
sentence enhancements available under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The
government sought application of the Safe Drinking Water Act's
definition of turbidity as a contaminant in order to apply stricter
sentencing guidelines. To that end, the government argued that the
sentence enhancement should have been used because White and
Taylor discharged pollutants into the environment.
The court of appeals ruled that the language of the Safe Drinking
Water Act read as a whole, precluded the use of the sentencing
guidelines the government sought. The court stated, "even if turbidity
is considered a 'pollutant' ... the district court did not err in refusing

